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Many developed countries, e.g. the UK, Germany, and Sweden, use or have used 
settlement policies to direct the inflow of new immigrants away from immigrant dense 
metropolitan areas. We evaluate a reform of Swedish immigration policy that featured 
dispersion of refugee immigrants across the country, but also a change in the approach to 
labor market integration. We focus exclusively on how immigrants fared because of the 
policy. The results indicate that immigrants experienced fairly substantial long run losses 
because of the policy. We also find that only a smaller share of this effect was associated 
with the dispersion of immigrants across regions. The larger share of the impact appears 
to stem from a common component that affected immigrants regardless of where they were 
located. Our somewhat speculative reading of this result is that it can be traced to a shift 
in emphasis of integration policy from a policy focusing on labor market assimilation to 
one of income support. 
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1.  Introduction 
The past couple of decades have seen an acceleration of immigration to developed 
countries. Concomitantly, there has been a shift in the ethnic composition of the 
immigrant inflow and an associated decline in the labor market performance of recently 
arrived immigrants compared to natives in these countries. These developments have put 
immigration policies high on the political agenda.  
One kind of immigration policy imposes restrictions on where newly arrived 
immigrants can settle. We call such policies settlement policies. Many countries practice 
(or have practiced) settlement policies; examples include the UK, Germany, and Sweden.1 
Under the new UK Asylum and Immigration Bill, refugee immigrants are placed outside 
London and Southeast England – the two regions where most previous immigrants reside. 
Germany imposes severe restrictions on where refugee immigrants can settle: unless 
having found a paid job, people must stay in a part of the country assigned by the 
government. In Denmark as well as the Netherlands, authorities try to disperse 
immigrants by obliging all municipalities to provide dwellings for a certain number of 
refugees (Dutch Refugee Council, 1999). In addition, local dispersal policies have been 
used within European metropolitan areas (Musterd et al., 2000). Sweden is another 
example, where a new system for refugee immigrant reception was introduced in the mid 
1980s. One aspect of the system was that asylum seekers were placed in regions outside 
the metropolitan areas to a greater extent. Thus, settlement policies are commonly 
employed, and a vital ingredient of the policies is the attempt to reduce immigrant 
concentration in big city areas. 
Broadly, two arguments have been put forward to rationalize the placement of new 
immigrants outside immigrant dense regions. The first argument is based on the idea that 
living in immigrant enclaves stalls immigrant assimilation by decreasing the rate at 
which immigrants acquire skills specific to the host country. The second argument is 
based on the perception that immigrants impose a fiscal and social burden on the host 
                                                 
1 Until the last few years, Israeli authorities located immigrants outside the major cities. Recently the 
policy has changed from one of deliberate placement to one of encouragement to settle in development 
towns; see Hiltermann (1991) for details on the Israel policy toward Russian immigrants. US immigration 
authorities distribute refugees through private organizations that arrange housing; the dispersion of 
immigrants across the US is not an explicit objective, however (Borjas, 2000a). Belgium is another country 
where some kind of restrictions are imposed on the residence of new immigrants.  
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regions. Placing immigrants outside the major cities thus distributes the perceived cost 
more equally across the host country.  
In this paper we examine the versatility of the first type of argument. In particular we 
ask the question: How did the Swedish settlement policy affect the economic outcomes of 
the immigrants subjected to the policy? The Swedish experience may be instructive for 
countries pursuing, or thinking of implementing, similar kinds of policies. 
Immigrant enclaves are not necessarily harmful for immigrants living there. The 
enclave may present the immigrant with more opportunities for gainful “trade” in the 
goods and labor markets; e.g. Lazear (1999). Also, ethnic neighborhoods may constitute an 
environment where the immigrant is exposed to less discrimination. Moreover, an ethnic 
“network” may improve labor market outcomes by providing information on job 
opportunities. Of course, “network effects” may also operate in the opposite direction by, 
e.g., disseminating information on welfare use; see Bertrand et al. (2000). One can also tell 
stories based on human capital externalities. According to one version, the quality of the 
enclave (the average stock of human capital) determines whether segregation is good or 
bad; e.g. Borjas (1998). In sum, the effect of living in an immigrant dense region is a priori 
ambiguous. 
Many empirical studies find a negative association between the economic outcomes of 
ethnic minorities and neighborhood characteristics such as segregation, immigrant 
density or ethnic concentration; see Kain (1992) and Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) for 
surveys. Whether these estimates should be treated as causal is another issue, since the 
majority of these studies take local characteristics as exogenous. Such an approach is, of 
course, plagued by Tiebout sorting bias. In related work we have examined the severity of 
this problem; see Edin et al. (2000a).2 We used the settlement policy as an exogenous 
source of variation arguing that initial placements were independent of unobserved 
individual characteristics. We found that there was a substantial downward bias in 
estimates that do not account for sorting; in fact, estimates that were free of sorting bias 
suggested that an increase in ethnic concentration improved the labor market outcomes 
                                                 
2 Borjas (1995), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), and Katz et al. (2000) are other examples of attempts to handle 
the sorting bias.  
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for refugee immigrants. Thus, from an empirical point of view, the effects of redirecting 
the inflow of immigrants away from enclaves are far from clear-cut. 
For a settlement policy to have real effects in the long run, the long-run distribution of 
immigrants in the receiving country must be affected. The Swedish policy had real 
consequences for immigrant location, as illustrated in Figure 1. It plots the share of the 
immigrant inflow and stock residing in Stockholm and the North of Sweden respectively. 
As indicated by the vertical dashed lines, the policy was viable between 1985 and 1991. 
Prior to 1985, most immigrants were essentially free to choose a region of residence. In the 
mid 1980s there was a drastic shift of the inflow towards the North. More importantly, the 
stocks were also affected. The share of this group of immigrants living in the north of 
Sweden increased from 5 percent in 1985 to reach 7 percent in 1991. The mirror image of 
this development is a reduction of the share living in Stockholm (from 36 percent in 1985 
to 32 percent in 1991). Thus, the policy initiative clearly increased the dispersion of 
immigrants across the country. 
 
Figure 1: Share of non-OECD immigrant inflow (solid) and stock (dashed) located in 


























Notes: “Stockholm” refers to the county of Stockholm, “North” to the six northernmost counties of Sweden.  
Own calculations using the LINDA immigrant sample. 
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There was more to the policy shift than inducing an increase in the dispersion of 
immigrants in Sweden. Prior to 1985, the integration of refugee immigrants had a direct 
connection to labor market policy since handling refugee issues was the responsibility of 
the Labor Market Board. This link was broken in 1985, when the Immigration Board 
became responsible for refugees. One of the implemented changes was that immigrants 
were placed on welfare for an introductory period of about 18 months.3 Thus, it seems that 
the new policy effectively shifted the focus from labor market integration to income 
support. Given that there were two facets of the policy shift, we try to decompose the 
effects of the shift into its component parts: one associated with redirecting the inflow of 
immigrants from immigrant dense regions; and another which we interpret as being 
associated with the shift in the approach to integration policy.  
Our results can briefly be summarized as follows. The overall effect of the policy was 
that immigrants suffered fairly substantial long-run earnings losses. Among those with 
earnings, we estimate an earnings loss of about 25 percent for those subjected to the 
policy. In addition, idleness increased by one third, and welfare receipt by approximately 
40 percent. The decomposition analysis suggests that the bulk of this loss is due to the 
shift in the approach to integration policies. With respect to the settlement policy per se, 
we find that had individuals stayed on in the assigned municipalities their labor market 
prospects would have been decidedly worse. However, in the longer run individuals moved 
out of regions with bad employment prospects, so that the initial effects were undone. 
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the 
institutional setting. In section 3, we present the evaluation framework. We think of an 
individual’s outcome as being determined by a common effect and an effect derived from 
the characteristics of the region. Section 4 turns to the empirical analyses. We use 
longitudinal micro data derived from the database LINDA (see Edin and Fredriksson, 
2000) and focus on three outcomes: earnings, idleness, and welfare dependency. We begin 
by estimating the overall effect of the policy without conditioning on regional 
characteristics. We then estimate the causal effect of regional characteristics, by using the 
quasi-experiment provided by the assignment policy. These estimates allow us to get at 
                                                 
3 The length of the introduction period appears to have varied across municipalities and years; in many 
cases it was considerably longer.  
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the component of the policy stemming from the fact that individuals were exposed to 
different regional environments. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2.  The institutional setting 
This section has two objectives. First, we describe the major institutional changes that 
were implemented in 1985 when the settlement policy was introduced. Second, we ask the 
question: Can we regard the settlement policy as a natural experiment? 
2.1 An overview4 
Prior to 1985, the Swedish Labor Market Board handled refugee issues. Presumably this 
was a remnant from the time when most immigrants entered Sweden for labor market 
reasons. Nonetheless, this state of affairs meant that there was a natural focus on labor 
market integration and immigration policy was linked to labor market policy. 
Immigration for labor market reasons from non-Nordic countries virtually ceased in the 
mid 1970s. Since then immigration from these countries is mainly for political reasons. 
Partly as a consequence of this change, the responsibility for handling refugee issues was 
transferred to the Swedish Immigration Board; formally the change took place in 1985, 
but there was a trial period in the autumn of 1984. 
Before the reform, a majority of refugee immigrants traveled directly to a municipality 
and applied for asylum there. Remaining refugee immigrants were so called quota 
refugees who stayed in centers before moving to a municipality.5 The Labor Market Board 
was responsible for organizing housing (if necessary) and assisting refugees in finding 
suitable training or employment. It seems that all refugee immigrants could influence the 
choice of initial residence; in any case, a vast majority arrived in the regions of Stockholm, 
Göteborg or Malmö (Ministry of Labor, 1981, 1983). 
After the reform, all refugee immigrants, apart from reunification immigrants, were 
subjected to the settlement policy. The Immigration Board assigned immigrants to a 
municipality of residence. Municipal authorities, in turn, assigned immigrants to an 
                                                 
4 This section draws primarily on The Committee on Immigration Policy (1996) and The Immigration Board 
(1997).  
5 The absolute number of quota refugees was roughly constant during the 1980s; thus, its share of the total 
refugee inflow decreased when immigration rose. In the fiscal year 1982/83, quota refugees made up 25% of 
the inflow (Ministry of Labor, 1983); in 1987 their share of the inflow had declined to 10%.  
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apartment. Reception in the municipalities was regulated in agreements between the 
Board and the municipality in question. 
At first the intention was to sign contracts with 60 municipalities (out of Sweden’s 284 
municipalities) that had suitable characteristics for reception, such as educational and 
labor market opportunities. Due to the increasing number of asylum seekers in the second 
half of the 1980s, a larger number of municipalities became involved; in 1989, 277 out of 
Sweden’s 284 municipalities participated. The factors that were supposed to govern 
placement were abandoned from the start. Instead, the availability of housing was the 
deciding factor. 
Employment opportunities were scant in the majority of municipalities that became 
involved in asylum reception. To rationalize placement in regions with poor employment 
prospects, the Immigration Board divided the integration process into two periods: an 
introductory period lasting for 18 months when the immigrant participated in Swedish 
courses and lived off welfare; 6 after the introductory period integration into the labor 
market commenced. 
The move to a strict settlement policy was a reaction to the concentration of 
immigrants to large cities that had taken place. The immigrants were to stay in the 
assigned municipalities during the entire introductory period. However, there were no 
restrictions against relocating if individuals could find a place on their own. The only real 
cost to the immigrant consisted of a wait for a new place in a language course. Receipt of 
welfare was not conditional on residing in the assigned municipality and the central 
government reimbursed the local governments for their welfare expenditures. From 1985 
through 1990, municipalities were reimbursed for their actual expenditures, so there was 
little incentive for local governments to pursue a policy that produced early assimilation 
into employment. This changed in 1991 when municipalities were given a standard 
amount per refugee. 
Formally, the policy of assigning refugees to municipalities was in place from 1985 to 
1994. In 1994, a new law was passed that gave immigrants the right to choose the initial 
                                                 
6 The length of the introduction period appears to have varied across municipalities and years; in many 
cases it was considerably longer.  
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place of residence provided that they could find an apartment on their own.7 However, the 
strictness of the placement policy gradually eroded during 1992–94, when there was an 
immigration peak caused by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The post-1991 period is less 
attractive for our purposes, since it contained larger degrees of freedom for the individual 
immigrant to choose the initial place of residence. 
The strictest application of the assignment policy was between 1987 and 1991. In 1988, 
a new law was passed which required “extraordinary reasons” for all others than family 
members to get the right to stay in a municipality instead of a refugee center while 
waiting for a residence permit.8 In effect, it seems that the law formalized a stricter 
practice, which had been introduced in 1987. During 1987–91, the placement rate, i.e. the 
fraction of refugee immigrants assigned an initial municipality of residence by the 
Immigration Board, was close to 90 percent. 
The municipal placement policy is an obvious difference between the pre- and post-
reform periods. Other differences may be harder to pinpoint, but are important for 
understanding the overall effect of the program.9 Our reading of the facts is that the 
reform shifted the policy focus away from labor market assimilation to an increased 
reliance on income support. Before the reform, employment officers were responsible for 
the arrangements concerning housing, education, and jobs. After the reform, ”refugee 
coordinators”, employed by the municipalities, handled these responsibilities. The direct 
link to the employment offices providing job search assistance, subsidized employment, or 
training programs were thus broken. In practice, there was insufficient cooperation 
between the coordinators and the employment offices. Partly as a result of this, the 
transition from basic language training, via additional courses in Swedish, to labor 
market training or a job, became less smooth and contained longer spells of inactivity. In a 
similar vein, the integration into the labor market was postponed relative to the time of 
arrival. Individuals arriving after the reform were granted (or subjected to) a long initial 
period (at least 18 months) of welfare receipt. This period was much shorter for 
                                                 
7 From then on more than 50 percent of the immigrants have used this opportunity. The Immigration Board 
has placed the remainder of the immigrants.  
8 This was a tightening of regulations in the following sense. Prior to the change, refugees could stay in a 
municipality of their own choice while waiting for a residence permit and, in general, the chance of being 
assigned the municipality of residence was greater than being assigned another municipality.  
9 Our information about the pre-reform period comes mainly from Ministry of Labor (1981, 1983) and 
officials at the Immigration Board.  
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immigrants arriving in previous years: quota refugees spent 4–6 months in the center 
before moving to a municipality to work or participate in labor market training; 
immigrants who had traveled directly to a municipality waited 2–3 months after receiving 
their residence permit before moving on to work or training.10  
To conclude, we think it is fair to say that the reform brought two major changes: the 
placement policy where the government assigned the initial place of residence, and a shift 
in focus away from labor market integration in favor of income support. 
2.2 Can the settlement policy be regarded as a natural experiment? 
In a companion paper (see Edin et al. (2000a)) we argued that the settlement policy 
provides an exogenous source of variation that identifies the causal effect of regional 
characteristics.  
If the policy is to provide a quasi-experiment, actual placement should be independent 
of any unobservable characteristics in the outcome equations. To what extent is this true? 
Were some individuals more likely placed than others? To answer these questions we 
interviewed placement officers and other officials of the Immigration Board. The following 
is a description of the practical implementation of the policy. 
An asylum seeker was placed in a refugee center while waiting for a decision from the 
immigration authorities. Refugee centers were distributed all over Sweden, and the port of 
entry did not influence to which center the individual was directed.  
There was a long wait for a residence permit. The mean duration between entry into 
Sweden and the receipt of a permit (conditional on receipt) varied between 3 and 12 
months during 1987–91; see Rooth (1999). There was a much shorter wait for a municipal 
placement after receiving the permit, partly because placement officers had explicit goals 
in terms of the duration of this spell.  
When it came to the municipal placement, weight was given to immigrant preferences. 
Most immigrants, of course, applied for residence in the traditional immigrant cities of 
Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. There were very few apartment vacancies in these 
locations, however, in particular during the second half of the 1980s when the housing 
                                                 
10 Quota refugees living in centers did not receive individual social assistance; instead, the Labor Market 
Board paid for costs of living. Immigrants living outside the centers received social assistance from the 
municipalities. The central government then reimbursed municipalities for the amount paid plus a 
standard addition of 25 percent of the amount to cover costs for public services.  
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market was booming. When the number of applicants exceeded the number of available 
slots, municipal officers selected the “best” immigrants. Notice that there was no 
interaction between municipal officers and refugees. The selection was, hence, purely in 
terms of observable characteristics; language, formal qualifications, and family size seem 
to have been the governing criteria. When the municipalities could “cream-skim”, they 
selected highly educated individuals and individuals that spoke the same language as 
some members of the resident immigrant stock. Single individuals were particularly 
difficult to place, since small apartments were extremely scarce. 
On the basis of the above description, we think that it is realistic to treat the municipal 
assignment as exogenous with respect to the random components of the outcomes of 
interest, conditional on observed characteristics. For highly qualified individuals this 
assumption can potentially be problematic. Cream-skimming on the part of municipal 
officers suggests that high-skilled may have been able to realize their preferred option.11  
3.  The evaluation framework 
In order to set the stage for the empirical analysis, we devote this section to making clear 
what we can estimate and the kind of restrictions that are necessary to estimating the 
parameters of interest. The basic problem is that we think that location matters for 
outcomes, but due to sorting we cannot consistently estimate the impact of regional 
characteristics. In this section we therefore ask two questions. What does an estimate of 
the overall effect of the policy – one derived without conditioning on regional 
characteristics – actually measure? Which restrictions must be satisfied for this estimate 
to be meaningful?  
We are also interested in decomposing the estimate of the overall effect of the policy. 
Our basic approach is to combine a difference-in-difference estimate of the overall effect 
with an estimate of the distribution effect. The distribution effect relates to the fact that 
immigrant arrival cohorts were subjected to different regional environments because of 
the placement policy. The residual in this decomposition is by construction the common 
effect of the policy. The distribution component can be estimated for the refugees arriving 
                                                 
11 In Edin et al. (2000a), we provide some evidence on this issue. On the whole, rates of post-placement 
mobility do not suggest that the highly qualified were more likely to exercise their preferred option when 
being assigned to a municipality.  
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during the strict settlement policy since the initial placement of these individuals provides 
exogenous variation that identifies the effects of regional characteristics.  
For purpose of concreteness, let us consider the determination of earnings. To simplify 
the exposition, we introduce the following assumptions. First, let the conditioning on 
exogenous individual characteristics be implicit. Second, assume that there are only two 
regions; associate a dummy variable d with one of them and let the characteristics of this 
region relative to the other be denoted  t z . Third, suppose that the individual return to 
regional characteristics is constant and equal to 
m b .12  
Consider a simple structural earnings equation for an immigrant i in arrival cohort 





i d z a y t t t t t a + b + = ln   (1) 
where  t ai  denotes unobservable ability relative to the mean outcome (
m at ) in cohort t. The 
estimation of equation (1) is complicated by the fact that individuals choose where to 
reside. In Edin et al. (2000a), we considered the sorting bias that may arise in this setting. 
In the simple framework we are examining here, the bias arises to the extent that there is 
a covariance between  t ai  and regional characteristics  t z . To be concrete, suppose for the 
moment that  t z  reflects immigrant density; then, if high ability individuals choose to live 
outside immigrant enclaves, the OLS estimate of 
m b  is biased downwards – and vice 
versa. 
Let us pool the two cross sections by defining the dummy variable p such that  1 = p  if 
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m E E a a a a - + - = f . If we have some exogenous variation identifying 
the coefficients on d, and assuming that the two cohorts are generically of equal mean 




ip E E a = a ), one can in principle use equation (2) to evaluate the settlement 
policy. The estimate of 
m f  would then capture a common program effect. 
                                                 
12 In Edin et al. (2000a), we compared an IV estimator and a control function estimator. The results were 
very similar across the two approaches, suggesting either that the return is constant across individuals, or 
that individuals do not make location decisions based on the individual return or information correlated 
with it.  
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The simple before-and-after estimator outlined in (2) rests on the implausible 
assumption that there are no time effects. This is a particularly untenable assumption 
given the time period that we are considering. We measure the outcomes in 1995–97 for 
those subjected to the policy, and in 1989–91 for pre-reform immigrants. In the beginning 
of the 1990s the unemployment rate in Sweden skyrocketed from less than 2 percent in 
1989 to over 9 percent in 1993. Suppose that there exists a proper comparison group 
(superindexed c) in the sense that the time effect is the same for this group as for refugee 
immigrants, and assume for now that there is no change in mean unobservable ability 
over time. Define a dummy m equaling unity if the individual is a refugee immigrant and 
pool the two groups into a single regression  
  i i i i i i i i i i i i i i d m p d p d m d m p p m a y a + m + m + m + m + p + l + l + = 4 3 2 1 2 1 ln   (3) 
The crucial parameter in (3) is the coefficient on  i im p , i.e., the difference-in-difference 




p a a a a - - - = p , which gives the common program effect if the 
comparison group properly identifies the pure time effect  ) ( 0
c c
p a a - . 
For reasons outlined above we do not want to condition on region of residence. The 
question then is: What does the difference in difference estimate without conditioning on 
i d  measure? To answer this question, average the structural earnings equation separately 
within group and time period and calculate the difference in difference using these 
averages. Assuming that any change in unobservable ability over time is equal in both 
groups, this yields 
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d d z a a a a y y
- b - b + - - b + D b - b +
D - D b + - - - = D - D = d
  (4) 
where D is the difference operator, and 
k d  reflects the distribution across regions in group 
k. Notice that we can estimate the coefficient on  ] [
c m d d D - D  by applying instrumental 
variables to the immigrant cohort subjected to the settlement policy.     
Equation (4) is written on a form that separates the components of interest from the 
ones we want to eliminate by imposing restrictions and choosing a suitable comparison 
group. It is clear that the first and the second component are key elements of the policy  
  13
change. As we have argued, there was a common component in the policy shift; the first 
component, which simply equals p in equation (3), measures this effect. Also, there was a 
regional dimension to the policy since immigrants were dispersed across different regions 
– this distribution effect is measured by the second component in equation (4). We refer to 
the sum of the common and distribution effect as the overall effect of the policy. The 
remaining components should not be attributed to the policy.13 
In the following proposition, we detail the conditions that the comparison group must 
satisfy in order for the “raw” difference-in-difference estimator  ) (d  to give a sensible 
estimate of the overall effect of the policy.  
 
Proposition: A proper comparison group should have the following characteristics 
relative to the refugee immigrants: (i) the common time effect should be the same; (ii) the 
changes in unobservable ability (if any) should be equal; (iii) the return to regional 
characteristics should be the same (
c m b = b ); and (iv) the distribution across regions prior 
to treatment should be equal (
c m d d 0 0 = ). Under conditions (i)–(iv) the estimator in (4) 
simplifies to 
  ( ) ] [ ] [ ) ( ) ( 0 0





p d d d d z a a a a D - D g + p = D - D b + - - - = d   (5) 
From a practical point of view the most important obstacles are conditions (i) and (iv). 
The first condition suggests that we should look for comparison groups along the 
observable skill dimension. The fourth condition arises because we do not want to 
condition on region of residence. It may disqualify many groups as comparisons simply 
because we know that residence patterns among, e.g., natives and immigrants are very 
different. Empirically, the fourth condition is likely to be of some importance since it 
eliminates the influence of the fourth component in (4). We know for a fact that, e.g., the 
dispersion of regional unemployment increases (i.e.  0 z z p -  changes) along with the 
overall rate of unemployment. So the time effects that render the before-and-after 
estimator implausible will also reduce the plausibility of estimates derived using a 
comparison group that does not satisfy the fourth criterion. When we return to the 
                                                 
13 One can also argue that part of the fifth component should be included in an evaluation of the policy 
success; to our minds, however, the effect of the policy on the characteristics of the region is likely to have 
been of minor importance.  
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selection of comparison groups in the next section, we mainly focus on these two 
conditions. However, we also discuss whether equality of the return to regional 
characteristics – condition (iii) – is a reasonable assumption. Moreover, in the empirical 
analysis we consider problems caused by differential changes in unobservable cohort 
quality – condition (ii). 
Given that the conditions in the proposition are satisfied, we can meaningfully 
decompose the overall effect of the policy into a common effect p and a dispersion effect 
] [
c m d d D - D g . The decomposition is made possible by the fact that the settlement policy 
gives exogenous variation in regions of residence that can be used to identify g . We can 
thus apply an instrumental variables approach to the cohort that was subjected to the 
policy to estimate the coefficient on the regional dummy. It is important to realize that 
these estimates are free from sorting bias if one believes in the quasi-experimental nature 
of the data.   In the next section, equation (5) and the criteria for identifying it, will guide 
our choice of empirical strategy and comparison group. 
4.  Empirical analysis 
We begin the empirical analysis by describing the data, and the choice of counterfactual 
and comparison group. Then we take a brief look at the impact the reform had on the 
geographic distribution and internal mobility of refugee immigrants. After that we 
proceed to the evaluation of the reform in terms of economic outcomes of the participants. 
First, we investigate the overall effect of the policy, and then we decompose this effect into 
a common effect and a dispersion effect. 
4.1 Data and sample selection 
The empirical analysis is based on data from the LINDA database. LINDA contains two 
panels: one of around 20 percent of the foreign-born population, and another of 
approximately 3 percent of the total Swedish population. The data are cross-sectionally 
representative. Data are available from 1960 and onwards, and are based on a 
combination of income tax registers, population censuses and other sources; for more 
details, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000).  
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We cannot identify refugee immigrants directly from our data. Instead we identify 
them by country of origin. As a general rule we include immigrants from countries that 
were not members of the OECD as of 1985 and countries outside Western Europe. The 
only exception from this rule is Turkey, which is included since it was the origin of a 
substantial inflow of refugee immigrants during the period. Furthermore, persons 
belonging to a household with either a Swedish-born grown-up or a person who 
immigrated in a previous year were excluded, since these individuals were likely to have 
immigrated as family members and, consequently, were not “treated”. We also apply an 
age restriction and base our analysis on individuals aged 18–55 at the time of entry into 
Sweden. Lastly, we focus on the immigration waves during 1987–89, when placement 
rates were of the order of 90 percent.   
4.2 The choice of counterfactual and comparison group 
In order to evaluate the reform it is necessary to construct a counterfactual. For this 
purpose, we use individuals who are identified as refugee immigrants (according to the 
above criteria) during the years 1981–83.  
Since we want to use the 1981/83 cohort as an approximation of the counterfactual for 
the 1987/89 cohort it is vital that the cohorts are similar in terms of observable and 
unobservable characteristics. With respect to observable characteristics, there were no 
important differences in terms of age and gender.14 In Tables 1 and 2, we compare the 
cohorts in terms of education and ethnicity. Table 1 begins by tabulating immigrants by 
educational level. While about 30 percent of the ”pre-program” cohort has a short high 
school education, the program cohort is more evenly spread out across educational levels.  
To us these differences do not raise great concern, however. In fact, if we impute years of 
education the cohorts are very similar; the 1987/89 cohort has 0.2 additional schooling 
years on average. 
The difference between the two cohorts in terms of ethnicity is a greater source of 
concern; see Table 2. It is well known that ethnicity is an important determinant of 
success in the receiving country; ethnicity is important as it influences language skills 
                                                 
14 The representative individual of the 1987/89 cohort was 0.58 years older and the probability of being 
male was 0.34 percent greater in comparison to the average individual in the 1981/83 cohort.   
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and the level of formal education varies by origin country (Borjas, 1994). The chief 
discrepancy between the two cohorts is that the 1981/83 cohort has more of the mass 
among immigrants from Eastern Europe. The later cohort, by contrast, has the greatest 
fraction of immigrants originating in the Middle East.15 
                                                 
15 The increase in refugee immigration from the Middle East is mainly due to the war between Iran and 
Iraq. The large share of Eastern Europeans in the earlier cohort is due to a substantial inflow of 
immigrants from Poland in 1982 following the Solidarity upheavals.  
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Table 1: Immigrant cohort by education, percent. 
  Immigrant cohort 
  1981/83  1987/89 
Missing  8.7  4.9 
< 9 years  17.1  16.5 
9–10 years  10.8  18.5 
High school £ 2 years  28.8  16.8 
High school > 2 years  13.5  18.5 
University < 3 years  10.2  13.4 
University ‡ 3 years  10.9  11.4 
# individuals  2,679  9,883 
Notes: Refugee immigrants aged 18–55 at immigration. The first time we observe education is in 1990. 
Therefore, education is measured 9 years post immigration for those arriving in 1981, and 8 years after 
immigration for later arrival cohorts. 
 
Table 2: Immigrant cohort by region of origin, percent. 
  Immigrant cohort 
  1981/83  1987/89 
Eastern Europe  37.3  18.0 
Africa  9.2  11.6 
Middle East  23.3  45.7 
Asia  14.2  8.3 
South America  16.0  16.4 
# individuals  2,679  9,883 
Notes: Refugee immigrants aged 18–55 at immigration. Measured 8 years after immigration. 
 
To us the differences in terms of region of origin seem substantial. To generate the 
counterfactual location distribution for the 1987/89 cohort, we reweigh observations in the 
1981/83 cohort such that the distribution over region of origin conforms to the 1987/89 
cohort. Whenever we talk about location differences across cohorts in the sequel, we refer 
to the differences between the 1987/89 cohort and the weighted 1981/83 cohort.  
On the more difficult question of whether unobserved heterogeneity will bias our policy 
evaluation, these aggregate statistics, of course, provide limited information. However, it 
is reassuring that formal education is so similar across the two cohorts. 
The choice of comparison group 
In section 3 we identified properties that a comparison group must have to make a 
meaningful analysis possible. Our strategy is to consider the following comparison groups:  
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1.  Natives 
2.  Low-skilled natives 
3.  Young and less educated natives 
4.  OECD immigrants, 81/83 and 87/89 
5.  Non-OECD immigrants, 1975/80 
The suitability of these groups depends on how well they conform to the conditions 
described in the proposition of section 3. 
Let us start with condition (i): a common time effect. This property is vital in order to 
credibly estimate the overall effect of the policy. Finding a group with identical time 
effects as refugee immigrants is of course a delicate matter. There is reason to believe that 
the first group (natives) may not experience the same time effects as refugee immigrants; 
however, we include them as a reference case.  
The second and third groups are obtained by restricting the native population in the 
observable skill dimension. Low-skilled natives are defined as the lowest quartile of the 
predicted outcome distribution.16 Young and less educated natives are defined as those 
who are between 20 and 30 years of age, and have completed less than 11 years of 
schooling. These two groups at the lower end of the skill distribution may experience 
similar responses to macro fluctuations as refugee immigrants.  
Our fourth potential comparison group is immigrants from the OECD countries 
arriving in the same time periods as the treated and counterfactual groups. This is the 
proper comparison if the susceptibility to macro shocks primarily is related to the time in 
the host country.  
The fifth comparison group is based on the idea that immigrants from certain regions 
may fare worse than others during economic recessions. If this is the case, then the 
1975/80 cohorts of non-OECD immigrants should be comparable with the sample of 
refugee immigrants. Results in Edin et al. (2000b) show that most of the economic 
assimilation of immigrants occurs within a few years after arrival.17 Since this group has 
                                                 
16 We obtained the predictions by regressing the outcome variable on individual characteristics (see 
equation (6)) and time controls, and then predicting values using only individual variables.  
17 With an assimilation measure that corresponds to this comparison (allowing assimilation to be affected 
by return migration), 79 percent of the earnings growth observed in the first ten years among non-OECD 
immigrants occurs between the first and fourth year; less than 2 percent of the growth comes between the 
seventh and the tenth year.   
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been in Sweden for a minimum of nine years before we first measure outcomes, we do not 
expect assimilation between 89–91 and 95–97 (when we measure outcomes) to bias the 
estimated time effects. 
In the first panel of Table 3 we substantiate the discussion with some evidence. It 
presents estimates on time dummies for the years 1982 and 1983 (relative to 1981) in 
earnings regressions using refugee immigrants and comparison groups in the pre-reform 
period only. An ideal comparison group has time estimates equal to those in the 
immigrant group; the estimate on the interaction dummy time*immigrant is then zero. 
Although we cannot reject the hypotheses that the time effects are the same, it is clear 
that the estimates we get using the OECD or 1975/80 comparison group are closer to zero 
than those relating to natives, especially for 1983 when time effects are larger. 
The fourth condition of the proposition stipulates that the distributions across regions 
prior to the reform should be equal. We investigate this issue in panel b of Table 3. The 
panel shows the percentage of the 81/83 immigrants and the comparison groups living in 
different regions of Sweden. The 1975/80 cohorts of immigrants appear to best meet the 
fourth criterion. OECD migrants also conform relatively well to refugee immigrants, 
whereas the distribution of natives is quite different.18 
There are additional reasons to prefer the 1975/80 cohorts of non-OECD immigrants as 
the comparison. It is a priori plausible that this group best meets the third condition, i.e., 
there is equality of the return to local characteristics. In Edin et al. (2000a), we find that 
the presence of other immigrants affects outcomes. It is quite likely that this effect is 
different for natives and perhaps also for OECD immigrants. Relative to OECD 
immigrants, there is also the advantage of having a larger number of observations; see 
Table A1a. The 1975/80 immigrants are therefore our primary comparison group, but in 
some cases we present results using also the OECD group. Some results for the native 
comparison groups are provided in the appendix. 
                                                 
18 Reweighing of the native comparison group to conform to the geographic distribution of refugee 
immigrants appears to be a possible alternative. Some experimentation along this line indicates that the 
estimated overall effect is very similar with original and reweighed data. However, since other arguments 
also favor the use of previous immigrant cohorts, we have not investigated this issue further.  
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Table 3: Suitability of comparison groups. 
 
(Refugee) 










Panel a: Estimated 
time effects.             
1982    –.013  –.027  –.016  –.012  –.019 
    (.003)  (.007)  (.007)  (.061)  (.018) 
1982*immigrant    –.001  .014  .002  –.001  .005 
    (.040)  (.042)  (.046)  (.082)  (.056) 
1983    –.060  –.151  –.061  –.122  –.131 
    (.003)  (.007)  (.007)  (.062)  (.018) 
1983*immigrant    –.067  .024  –.066  –.006  .003 
    (.042)  (.044)  (.048)  (.085)  (.059) 
             
Panel b: Regional 
distribution, percent             
Stockholm  46.77  18.29  17.09  14.97  42.23  45.68 
Mid (east)  13.21  17.02  17.68  16.68  11.93  12.60 
Southeast  4.03  9.21  9.43  10.83  4.45  5.14 
South  17.54  14.13  13.66  14.76  11.21  15.17 
West  14.33  19.79  20.10  20.82  17.66  17.54 
Mid (north)  2.39  10.31  11.26  10.77  5.61  1.83 
North (mid)  0.97  4.84  4.82  4.99  1.82  0.74 
North (upper)  0.75  6.42  5.97  6.18  5.10  1.31 
Notes: Panel a shows estimates from difference-in-difference estimations of log earnings. The dependent 
variable is earnings eight years after immigration. In addition to the time dummies (immigration year) and 
interactions time*immigrant, the regression includes individual characteristics; see equation (6). Panel b 
shows the pre-reform geographic distribution of refugee immigrants (81/83 cohorts) and the comparison 
groups. To facilitate comparison across comparison groups, the location distributions for refugee 
immigrants are not weighted to conform to the 87/89 region-of-origin distribution. 
4.3 Mobility and concentration 
Since the difference in mobility is one indicator of how refugee immigrants perceived the 
reform, this section compares post-immigration mobility across policy regimes. We base 
the comparison on a simple before-and-after approach.19 
If a consequence of the government policy was that immigrants were placed in regions 
that they deemed inferior, we should observe greater mobility in the 1987/89 program 
cohort in comparison to the earlier cohort. Moreover, the economic consequences of the 
reform will of course depend on whether they stayed on in the assigned region.  
The prediction that mobility should be greater in the program cohort is clearly 
contingent on immigrants being able to choose/identify their most preferred region upon 
arrival. There are plausible reasons why this might not be the case. For one thing, there is 
                                                 
19 In related research we found no obvious time effects in migration and location patterns; see Åslund 
(2000).  
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probably genuine uncertainty about the regional variation in the pay-off to labor market 
skills and, hence, the answer to this question is not obvious. 
 
Table 4: Individuals who stayed, emigrated, and relocated, percent. 
  Immigrant cohort 
  1981/83  1987/89 
  t and t+8  t and t+8 
Stayed  51.2  46.5 
Emigrated  13.8  13.6 
Relocated  35.0  39.9 
Notes: Refugee immigrants aged 18–55 at immigration. Probability of emigration equals probability of not 
being in sample (i.e. the figures include deceased). t denotes year of immigration. Observations in the 
1981/83 cohort weighted to correspond to the (period t) region-of-origin distribution in the 1987/89 cohort.   
 
We start by comparing mobility across the two cohorts; see Table 4. Eight years after 
the immigration year, the probability of remaining in the initial location is lower among 
those who were assigned a municipality by government authorities; the propensities to 
emigrate are roughly equal, but there is more internal mobility in the 1987/89 cohort. 
However, regression based comparisons (controlling for gender, age, marital status, and 
region of origin) do not give strong support to changes in migration propensities (Åslund, 
2000).  
Thus, post-immigration mobility seems to be high; this is true for both cohorts. To what 
kinds of regions did the immigrants move? We investigate this question in Table 5. As we 
have noted, the policy reform was a reaction to the concentration of the foreign-born to 
metropolitan areas, primarily Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö. As a consequence of the 
reform, we should expect a shift in the initial location pattern in favor of sparsely 
populated areas, often located in the northern part of Sweden.  
Table 5, which divides region of residence by population density, shows that the 
distribution of initial location across the two cohorts is radically different. There is 
concentration over time in both cohorts, although much more pronounced in the 1987/89 
cohort. Nevertheless, there is far from total convergence of the two distributions. Thus, it 
seems that the reform did have lasting effects on location. A further look at the residential 
patterns suggests that mobility is not just from a desolated North to the populous South, 
but also to the regional centers in the north of Sweden.  
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Table 5: Location patterns by population density, percent.  
  Immigrant cohort 
  1981/83  1987/89 
  t  t+8  t  t+8 
Region 1 (Stockholm)  48.0  52.3  25.0  33.6 
Region 2 (Göteborg & Malmö)  15.3  18.0  16.2  25.6 
Region 3  29.2  24.3  31.4  29.5 
Region 4  6.4  4.1  17.7  8.5 
Region 5  0.8  0.9  3.4  1.7 
Region 6 (Sparsely populated)  0.3  0.4  6.3  1.1 
Notes: Refugee immigrants aged 18–55 at immigration. ”Region 1” most densely populated; ”Region 6” least 
densely populated. t denotes year of immigration. Observations in the 1981/83 cohort weighted to 
correspond to the region-of-origin distribution in the 1987/89 cohort. 
 
These findings show that there were no clear-cut differences in mobility between pre-
reform immigrants and program participants. However, there was more concentration 
among immigrants who were assigned a municipality by government authorities. Two 
more things should be noted. First, the fact that there is also a lot of mobility in the cohort 
that was supposedly free to choose, suggests that informational problems may be of some 
importance. Second, even eight years after entry to Sweden, the post-reform distribution of 
immigrants has far from converged to the pre-reform distribution of immigrants. 
The latter point implies that if there was an overall effect of the reform on economic 
outcomes, some of it could origin in the change in the long-run dispersion of refugee 
immigrants. Below, we first investigate the total effect, and then decompose it in order to 
determine the importance of the distribution component relative to the common 
component of the policy. 
4.4 The overall effect of the policy 
In this section, we set out to estimate the total effect of the reform on the economic 
outcomes of the participants. We use a difference-in-difference approach and relate the 
87/89 and 81/83 immigrant cohorts to the comparison groups discussed in section 4.2. We 
measure outcomes eight years after immigration. The reason for choosing outcomes such a 
long time after immigration is that we are interested in the long-run impact on 
participants. Also, the policy did not aim at initial labor market success, since it 
prescribed language training and other introduction activities rather than immediate 
entry on the labor market.  
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The re-direction of the inflow away from big-city regions was an important part of the 
policy change. Partly, this was motivated by a belief that regions matter for outcomes. 
However, conditioning on region of residence will potentially result in estimates suffering 
from sorting bias. Under the conditions outlined in the proposition we can still estimate a 
sensible overall program effect. 
In the analysis, we focus on three measures of the outcome. The first measure is (the 
log of) annual earnings; the second is idleness (defined as neither having positive earnings 
nor being enrolled in education); the third is welfare receipt. Table A2 shows means and 
standard deviations of these variables eight years after arrival for both immigrant and 
comparison groups. Program participants have worse labor market outcomes on all 
accounts. Among those with earnings, people subjected to the policy earn about 60 percent 
less than previous immigrants. Further, idleness is almost 17 percentage points higher in 
the 87/89 than in the 81/83 cohort. However, there are clear changes in the earnings and 
employment variables in the comparison groups as well, particularly concerning idleness 
for OECD and 75/80 immigrants. 
The difference-in-difference estimates of the total effects of the reform are derived from 
the following prototype specification: 
  i i i i i i i i i p m p m m outcome e + d + f + f + ¢ + ¢ + a = 1 0 1 0 X X b b   (6) 
where  i outcome  is the outcome in  8 + t  for individual i.  i X  is a vector of individual 
characteristics (gender, age, age squared, marital status, level of education, and region of 
origin),  i m  is a dummy variable for refugee immigrants, and  i p  is a dummy for the 
reform period. In this setup, d is the parameter of primary interest; it is the difference-in-
difference estimator of the overall effect of the new policy. To simplify the decomposition of 
the overall effect, we use the linear probability model for binary outcome variables.  
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f1  # individuals  R-squared 
         
Log earnings         
OECD  –.331  –.164  13,187  .11 
  (.047)  (.036)     
Immigrants 75/80  –.263  –.233  42,587  .08 
  (.032)  (.013)     
Idleness         
OECD  .066  .082  18,279  .15 
  (.013)  (.010)     
Immigrants 75/80  .056  .092  54,448  .12 
  (.009)  (.004)     
Welfare         
OECD  .085  –.005  18,279  .12 
  (.013)  (.009)     
Immigrants 75/80  .101  –.021  54,448  .10 
  (.010)  (.003)     
         
Notes: OLS parameter estimates, standard errors in parentheses. The regressions also include immigrant 
status, gender, age, age squared, level of education, region of origin, marital status (dummies for (a) being 
married, (b) having at least one child under 16, and interactions between gender and (a) and (b)), and 
interactions between immigrant status and remaining individual characteristics. For details on the 
different samples, see Tables A1a–c. Results using other comparison groups are presented in Table A3. 
 
Table 6 shows the results for the three outcomes, using two different comparison 
groups. Starting with earnings, we find that the effects are quite large; according to the 
estimates, program participants with earnings eight years after arrival suffered 
approximately a 25-percent loss in earnings due to the policy.  
Furthermore, the policy increased the likelihood of being idle. The estimates imply that 
the probability of idleness is about 5–7 percentage points higher for those subjected to the 
policy; in relative terms this translates to an increase of about a third. 
For welfare receipt, the estimates indicate that program participants were 9–10 
percentage points more likely than previous immigrants to receive social assistance eight 
years after arrival; in relative terms this amounts to an increase in the probability of more 
than 40 percent. Note, though, that there is a negative time trend for 75/80 immigrants. 
This may seem surprising, given the increase in households receiving social assistance in 
the first half of the 1990s (Arslanogullari, 2000). According to Hansen and Lofstrom 
(1999), immigrants in Sweden assimilate out of the welfare system; the trend in the 75/80 
group may be explained by the fact that this group has spent more time in Sweden in the  
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87/89 period.20 If we relate welfare receipt to natives, the program effects are smaller but 
still significant; see Table A3. 
Supported by Table 3, we believe that the two comparison groups used in Table 6 
capture the relevant time effects in a reasonable way. Of course, we could always 
eliminate the program effect by comparing with a very restricted group, with especially 
bad outcomes and time effects. To create a “lower bound” for the estimates, we look at the 
two less skilled native groups; the results are found in Table A3. The parameter estimates 
are highly significant for all outcomes, although smaller when we use the group of young 
and less educated. Moreover, we have performed a similar operation on the main 
comparison groups (OECD and 75/80), where we excluded the quartile predicted to have 
the best outcomes; the results from these exercises are very similar to those in Table 6. 
According to the second condition of the proposition, the change in unobservable ability 
(cohort quality) over time must be the same among refugee immigrants and the 
comparison group. Can the results of Table 6 be rationalized by declining cohort quality?21 
Declining cohort quality may be a problem if the data are not sufficiently rich in terms of 
individual characteristics and the specification is not flexible enough. According to Borjas 
(2000b), national origin is the crucial factor behind changes in cohort quality in the US. 
Notice in this respect that our findings are robust to substituting the region of origin 
dummies with controls for country of origin. We have also interacted all individual 
variables with region of origin, so that e.g. the returns to education are allowed to vary 
between people from different regions; again, the results do not change.22  
There is no doubt that the outcomes of people subjected to the policy were worse than 
those of previous immigrants in absolute terms. The more difficult task is to separate the 
program effect from a time effect that would have changed the outcomes also in absence of 
the policy change. We have presented evidence that regardless of the comparison group, 
the program had a deteriorating effect on all outcomes. Furthermore, this holds in 
instances when we use comparison groups that we expect (and find) to suffer severely 
                                                 
20 Differing age structure is another potential explanation (if its effect is not fully captured by the linear 
and quadratic terms). We have experimented with regressions where data were weighted according to the 
age structure of the 87/89 refugee immigrants. The results are in general unaffected. 
21 Nonrandom emigration of the 1975/80 immigrants could potentially be a problem. However, results in 
Edin et al. (2000b) show that most emigration occurs shortly after arrival. 
22 We have also estimated the model separately for people from different countries. Not surprisingly there 
are some variations in the results; however, the negative impact of the program always remains.  
  26
during to the recession in the early 1990s. Therefore, our conclusion is that the policy 
change adversely affected the economic outcomes of refugee immigrants. 
4.5 Effects of the placement 
We now turn to investigating the effects that placement had on economic outcomes: Were 
people located where there were good or bad prospects? In terms of equation (5), this 
analysis considers the distribution component, i.e., the effect of the change in distribution 
over municipalities on outcomes. 
The residential location after some time in the host country is not exogenous. 
Therefore, our strategy is to estimate versions of the following regression for the 1987/89 
cohort: 
  ￿ e + g + = j ij ij j i ij d outcome X ' b   (7) 
where outcome denotes either log earnings, the probability of being idle, or welfare 
dependency, X is a vector of individual characteristics (gender, age, age squared, marital 
status, level of education, region of origin, and immigration year), and  ij d  is a dummy 
variable for residing in municipality j. All variables included in equation (7) are measured 
eight years after immigration. To avoid bias due to sorting we instrument  ij d . We 
instrument the dummy for the individual’s current municipality with two dummies: one 
indicates that the individual was placed in the current municipality, the other that the 
individual was placed in the county block of the current municipality. The first stage 
equation is estimated separately for each municipality. To ensure that the municipality 
effects on outcomes,  j g , could be identified, and reasonably precisely estimated, we 
required that there should be at least 5 refugee immigrants with positive earnings in our 
sample that reside in municipality j; if a municipality failed this requirement it was 
merged with a bordering municipality.23  
We ask two questions in this part of the analysis. First, what part of the difference-in-
difference in outcomes originates in the change of geographic distribution? The answer to 
                                                 
23 Excluding municipalities resulting from splits during the relevant time period, the maximum number of 
municipality effects we could have estimated would have been 278. The minimum limit of at least 5 
resident immigrants reduces the number of estimable municipality effects to 167. In principle, we also 
require that 1 assigned individual should remain in the municipality in question, otherwise the assigned 
municipality will have no predictive power in the first stage regression. The weight given to municipalities 
with few observations is relatively low; 11 percent of the sample lived in a municipality with less than 20 
observations.  
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this question gets at the distribution component of equation (5). Second, what would the 
effect have been if people had stayed in their assigned municipalities? 
We evaluate the placement effect in the following way. Let 
m
jt d  be the probability of 
residing in municipality j in time period t (0 if pre-reform, p if reform) for an individual 
belonging to the refugee immigrant population (m). Let 
c
jt d  be the analogous probability 
for the comparison group (c). Our measure to answer the above questions is then  








jp d d d d ˆ ) ( ) ( 0 0   (8) 
Thus, we use the estimates of  j g  in combination with the differences in distributions of 
immigrants and the comparison group to calculate weighted averages of the location 
effects. We calculate two measures of placement success. First, we use the distributions 
corresponding to the time point when the treated and counterfactual groups have been 
eight years in Sweden; the difference-in-difference between the weighted averages is then 
the distribution component of equation (5). Second, we use the initial distributions, i.e., 
those that correspond to the time of arrival for the treated and counterfactual groups. We 
then estimate what the effect would have been if people had remained in their assigned 
municipalities. Thus we examine whether program participants were located in better or 
worse regions relative to the choices of previous immigrants. 
 
Table 7: How the placement affected outcomes, standard errors in parentheses. 






  (a)  (b)     
Distribution component of difference-in-
difference estimate (equation (5)). Distribution 










Distribution component if people had stayed in 











Notes: The calculations use the difference-in-difference of distributions, with 75/80 immigrants as the 
comparison group. Estimates in column 1b control for regional ”price” dispersion as explained in the text. 
Observations in 1981/83 cohort weighted to conform to the region-of-origin distribution in the 1987/89 
cohort. Estimates for individual variables presented in Table A4. The estimates for idleness and welfare 
receipt were obtained by applying the linear probability model. 
 
Table 7 presents the estimates; the calculations use 1975/80 immigrants as the 
comparison group (estimates on individual characteristics are presented in Table A4). For 
simplicity, the estimates for idleness and welfare receipt were obtained by applying the  
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linear probability model. In column 1, we give the estimates on earnings.24 There are two 
sets of estimates of the reform: column 1a has no control for regional price dispersion, 
while column 1b controls for the dispersion of regional house prices. The latter estimates 
were constructed by regressing the set of local effects  ) (g  on a vector of house prices (p). 
The difference-in-difference in distributions were then applied to the transformed local 
effects,  ) ˆ ( p a - g  (where a ˆ  is the estimate from the above regression). 
From the results in the first row, it seems that the distribution component accounts for 
a limited part of the overall effect of the policy on earnings. Without control for “prices”, 
the estimates suggest a six percent decrease (t-ratio 1.77); with controls the estimate is 
positive but not significant. 
For idleness and welfare it appears as if the distribution component had more of an 
impact; see columns (2) and (3). There is an increase in idleness of around 3 percentage 
points as a result of the placement policy (the t-ratio is 2.29); analogously, welfare receipt 
increased by 4 percentage points (t-ratio, 2.54). 
Let us now turn to the second row and the comparison of initial location effects in the 
immigrant cohorts. Even though the standard errors are high, the estimates suggest that 
the initial location was associated with sizable earnings losses: had the refugees stayed on 
in the assigned regions their earnings would have been 39 percent (t-ratio, 1.79) lower 
than in the situation when they could freely chose place of residence; the estimated effect 
on ”real” earnings is a 20 percent (t-ratio, 0.78) loss. 
People were initially placed in regions with bad prospects for employment. The 
difference in idleness obtained when applying the initial distributions is rather dramatic. 
The estimate suggests that had the refugees stayed on in the assigned municipality the 
probability of being idle would have been 20 percentage points higher (the t-ratio is 2.08) 
compared to the situation when they could freely choose place of residence. 
Column 3 shows that we get a similar result for welfare. The probability of being 
welfare dependent was 27 percentage points higher (t-ratio 2.60) in the 87/89 cohort than 
in the 81/83 cohort using the initial distribution. 
                                                 
24 Using log earnings, of course, yields estimates that do not take behavior into account. The estimates of 
the impact of the reform are biased to the extent that selection affects the estimates of our location 
dummies. The reason for not estimating selection corrected earnings regressions is that it is difficult to 
come up with the exclusion restrictions necessary to produce credible estimates.  
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For all three outcomes examined, we see that relative to the 1981/83 cohort individuals 
escaped regions with bad prospects by moving out of assigned municipalities. Most of the 
rather dramatic differences observed initially have disappeared after eight years in the 
host country.  
Did people relocate to better or worse regions also in absolute terms? To answer this 
question, we must look at the change in the distribution of each cohort between the initial 
time of observation and eight years later. To this end, we calculate the difference in the 
weighted average between the two time points for each cohort. 
The calculations indicate that there is very little change among pre-reform immigrants, 
and that the bulk of the decrease in the difference between cohorts stems from program 
participants moving to better locations. For example, the difference in idleness was only –
0.037 (standard deviation 0.025) in the 81/83 cohort, and –0.202 (0.102) in the 87/89 
cohort. For earnings, the corresponding figures were –0.006 (0.069) and 0.429 (0.301). 
Thus, there is no evidence that immigrants in general move to better regions in terms of 
labor market prospects, but that this was a phenomenon connected with the placement 
policy. 
Why was the initial location bad for outcomes? In related work, we estimate the causal 
effects of a set of municipal characteristics on the outcomes of program participants; see 
Edin et al. (2000a). We find that local unemployment has a negative effect, and that the 
presence of other immigrants, particularly those from the own country, influences the 
outcome positively. Compared to the 81/83 cohort, the 87/89 immigrants were assigned to 
municipalities with lower representation of immigrants and higher unemployment. When 
we try to explain the estimated municipal effects with observable local characteristics, it 
turns out that the most significant effects come from municipal unemployment (negative) 
and the size of the group from the own country (positive).25 
Taken together, our findings suggest that the long run effects of location on earnings, 
employment, and welfare receipt were relatively small. However, this is because people 
moved out of bad regions, not because placement created a distribution that was equal to 
                                                 








j u et im n e b b b b a g + + + + + = + + + + 8 3 8 2 8 1 8 0 log log log , where  j g  is the estimated 
municipal effect (from the log earnings equation), n is the number of natives, im is the number of other 
immigrants, et is the number of people from the own country, and u is local unemployment. The regression 
includes 168 observations; the explanatory variables are municipal means (for program participants). This 
regression yields an R-square of about 15 percent, so the local characteristics included explain some but far 
from all of the difference in municipal effects.  
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that chosen by the 81/83 immigrants in terms of outcomes. On the contrary, had people 
stayed on in the assigned municipalities, their outcomes would have been substantially 
worse. 
4.6 Decomposing the overall effect 
Equation (5) states that under certain conditions, the difference-in-difference in outcomes 
can be written 
  ] [ ln ln
c m c m d d y y D - D + = D - D = g p d  
Since we have estimated the overall effect (d) and the distribution effect (corresponding to 
the second term on the right-hand side), we can “back out” an estimate of the common 
effect of the reform (p). Throughout the decomposition analysis, we use the 1975/80 non-
OECD immigrant cohorts as comparison. 
Table 8 suggests that about half of the effect on idleness came from the common 
component of the reform, and the other half originated in the change in distribution over 
municipalities. For earnings and welfare receipt, the decomposition attributes a majority 
of the loss to the common component. 
 










Log Earnings  –.263  –.200  –.063  75.7 
Idleness  .056  .026  .030  46.4 
Welfare  .101  .063  .038  60.4 
Notes: “Total” taken from Table 6 and “Distribution” from the first row of Table 7. “Common” is the 
difference between “Total” and “Distribution”. 
 
Since the estimated total and distribution effects vary between comparison groups, the 
decomposition is somewhat sensitive to how we make the comparison. Some 
experimentation with alternative comparison groups reveal that the fraction attributed to 
the respective components is quite stable for earnings, but varies more for idleness and 
welfare. If we instead use natives as comparison, the percentage attributed to the common 
component is larger for idleness (72%), and smaller for welfare (38%).26 
                                                 
26 With the OECD comparison group, we in fact get negative estimates on the distribution component, 
which implies that the common effect is larger than the total effect; however, the small number 
observations is problematic for this group in this part of the analysis.  
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Our conclusion from this section is that the bulk of the impact of the reform came from 
a common effect, rather than from the change in geographic distribution induced by the 
placement policy. Our interpretation of this result is that the policy shift increased the 
initial reliance on income support as opposed to labor market policy, which had 
detrimental effects on people arriving under the new policy. 
4.7 Is it possible to evaluate the reform? 
There are two issues that could make evaluation of the reform difficult. They both relate 
to the unprecedented size of the inflow of refugee immigrants during the 87/89 period. 
While the placement policy was in place, the annual number of residence permits issued to 
refugees increased from levels of 4,000–6,000 before the reform, to a peak at almost 25,000 
in 1989. 
The first question is whether the municipal distribution of the 81/83 cohort is an 
appropriate counterfactual distribution. It is possible that the increased inflow of 
immigrants would have changed the distribution also in absence of the reform. We try to 
capture this by using the difference-in-difference between the distributions. The 
distribution of the 81/83 cohort plus the change within the group of 1975/80 immigrants is 
probably the best approximation we can get of what the distribution would have been if 
the program had not been implemented. 
The second question is whether the size of the inflow itself affects the outcomes. This 
supply effect is only a problem if recent arrivals are affected differently than the rest of 
the refugee immigrant population; otherwise, the 1975/80 comparison group should 
experience the same change. We have investigated this issue further by dropping 
individuals arriving in 1989, when the total inflow was 77 (54) percent larger than in 1987 
(1988). The difference-in-difference estimates of the total effects are slightly smaller with 
this restriction.27  
We have also looked at whether the performance of refugee immigrants arriving during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s varies with the number of immigrants, but found no 
correlation between outcomes eight years after arrival and the size of the inflow at an 
                                                 
27 With 75/80 immigrants as comparison, the estimates are: log earnings: –0.246 (0.036); idleness: 0.041 
(0.009); welfare receipt: 0.073 (0.010).  
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individual’s time of arrival. Admittedly, the value of this evidence is limited since there 
are no years with refugee immigration comparable to the late 1980s, but at least the 
results are not at odds with our evaluation approach. 
5.  Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate a Swedish reform of the refugee immigrant 
reception system. The reform, which was implemented in the later half of the 1980s, had 
two facets. First, immigrants were no longer free to choose their initial place of residence; 
rather they were assigned to less immigrant dense regions. Second, the reform shifted the 
focus away from labor market assimilation. We have focused exclusively on how refugee 
immigrants fared because of the reform. 
We use three outcome measures: log earnings, idleness, and welfare receipt. The  
overall effect of the reform was detrimental to all of these outcomes. Our analysis suggests 
that eight years after arrival earnings were 25 percent lower because of the new policy; 
idleness increased by around six percentage points; and welfare receipt rose by almost 10 
points. 
Because there were two facets of the reform we decompose the overall effect into a 
common component and a distribution component. The distribution component is 
associated with the shift in the regional distribution of immigrants across Sweden. The 
decomposition analysis suggests that more than half of the total effect can be attributed to 
the common effect. A somewhat speculative reading of this is that the weaker link 
between refugee reception and integration into the labor market, and increased focus on 
income support, had long-lasting negative effects on individual outcomes. 
The negative effects of the dispersion policy would, however, have been larger if people 
had stayed on in the assigned municipalities. If they would have stayed, the estimates 
suggest that the probability of being idle, for example, would have been 20 percentage 
points higher because of the placement policy. Since people moved out of the initial 
locations, this loss was largely undone, however. We find some indications that the effects 
of the distribution component of the policy can be traced to placement in regions with high 
unemployment and absence of ethnic networks.  
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In this Swedish case, the increased long-run dispersion of refugee immigrants that was 
achieved with the policy came at the expense of individual outcomes in the labor market. 
An indirect implication of our findings is that with a more careful choice of municipalities, 
and with a policy more focused on the labor market, this cost could at least to some extent 
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Table A1a: Sample sizes. 
  Total sample    Earnings sample 
Group  81/83  87/89    81/83  87/89 
Immigrants  2,679  9,883    2,311  6,418 
Natives  363,083  378,016    337,925  342,077 
OECD migrants  1,973  3,744    1,659  2,799 
Immigrants 75/80  20,474  21,412    17,826  16,032 
Young and less educated 
natives 
68,211  48,099 
 
66,177  42,808 
Notes: Sample sizes by group and period. Earnings sample contains only those with positive earnings in 8 
years after arrival. “Immigrants” are taken from the LINDA immigrant and population samples. They are 
identified as refugees according to criteria described in section 2. “Natives” come from the LINDA 
population sample. “OECD migrants” consists of individuals from the LINDA immigrant and population 
samples who immigrated during the same period as the refugee immigrants. “Immigrants 75/80” consists of 
individuals in the LINDA immigrant sample who arrived from non-OECD countries between 1975 and 1980. 
The same age restrictions apply in all these groups: 26–63 when outcomes are measured (18–55 at arrival 
for “Immigrants” and “OECD migrants”). “Young and less educated natives” are natives aged 20–29 with no 
more than short high school education (11 years of schooling). 
 
 
Table A1b: Sample composition, percent. 
  Total sample    Earnings sample 
Year       
81  5.45    6.77 
82  9.08    11.42 
83  6.79    8.28 
87  20.47    20.28 
88  27.92    26.23 
89  30.28    27.01 
Notes: Entries give the percentage of immigrants in the respective period (pre-reform, reform) immigrating 
in a particular year. The comparison groups are weighted to conform to this composition; i.e. the weight 
given to observations made in different years are the same in all comparison groups as in the immigrant 




Table A1c: Summary statistics, individual characteristics, means (std). 
  Refugee immigrants  Natives  OECD migrants  Immigrants 75/80 
Young and less 
educated natives 
Variable  81/83  87/89  81/83  87/89  81/83  87/89  81/83  87/89  81/83  87/89 
Female  .479  .445  .491  .489  .533  .448  .486  .487  .458  .442 
  (.500)  (.497)  (.500)  (.500)  (.499)  (.497)  (.500)  (.500)  (.498)  (.497) 
Age  37.549  38.124  43.231  43.543  37.393  38.372  39.542  42.872  24.470  25.345 
  (8.456)  (8.289)  (10.536)  (10.601)  (8.674)  (8.914)  (7.961)  (8.398)  (2.805)  (2.622) 
Married  .605  .592  .596  .532  .521  .463  .665  .609  .155  .123 
  (.489)  (.492)  (.491)  (.499)  (.500)  (.499)  (.472)  (.488)  (.361)  (.329) 
Kid  .500  .514  .350  .330  .434  .402  .575  .491  .221  .235 
  (.500)  (.500)  (.477)  (.470)  (.496)  (.490)  (.494)  (.500)  (.415)  (.424) 
Married* female  .299  .280  .304  .272  .299  .228  .338  .302  .096  .073 
  (.458)  (.449)  (.460)  (.445)  (.458)  (.420)  (.473)  (.459)  (.295)  (.260) 
Kid*female  .287  .291  .196  .198  .292  .244  .320  .263  .176  .194 
  (.452)  (.454)  (.397)  (.398)  (.455)  (.429)  (.467)  (.440)  (.381)  (.395) 
Education                     
<9 years or missing  .258  .214  .220  .126  .251  .186  .273  .201  .033  .014 
  (.437)  (.410)  (.415)  (.331)  (.434)  (.389)  (.445)  (.401)  (.179)  (.119) 
9–10 years  .108  .185  .126  .122  .123  .187  .123  .132  .224  .264 
  (.311)  (.388)  (.331)  (.327)  (.328)  (.390)  (.329)  (.339)  (.417)  (.441) 
High school £2 yrs  .288  .168  .307  .358  .239  .217  .285  .317  .743  .721 
  (.453)  (.374)  (.461)  (.479)  (.426)  (.412)  (.452)  (.465)  (.437)  (.448) 
High school >2 yrs  .135  .185  .111  .121  .126  .144  .111  .121     
  (.342)  (.388)  (.314)  (.326)  (.332)  (.351)  (.314)  (.326)     
University <3 yrs  .102  .134  .116  .145  .115  .124  .095  .112     
  (.304)  (.341)  (.320)  (.352)  (.319)  (.330)  (.293)  (.316)     
University ‡3 yrs  .109  .114  .120  .129  .146  .141  .112  .116     
  (.312)  (.317)  (.325)  (.335)  (.353)  (.348)  (.316)  (.320)     
Ethnicity                     
Nordic          .622  .644         
          (.485)  (.479)         
Western Europe          .312  .262         
          (.464)  (.440)         
Eastern Europe  .373  .180          .351  .338     
  (.484)  (.384)          (.477)  (.473)     
Africa  .092  .116          .091  .087     
  (.288)  (.320)          (.288)  (.282)     
Middle East  .233  .457          .277  .287     
  (.423)  (.498)          (.447)  (.452)     
Asia  .142  .083      .008  .007  .120  .126     
  (.349)  (.277)      (.090)  (.083)  (.325)  (.331)     
North America          .051  .070         
          (.220)  (.255)         
South America  .160  .164          .161  .163     
  (.366)  (.370)          (.367)  (.369)     
Oceania          .007  .017         
          (.082)  (.129)         
Notes: Sample sizes and composition (by year) in Tables A1a–b. ”Kid” = 1 if there were children aged 15 or 
less in the household, 0 otherwise.  
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Table A2: Earnings, idleness, and welfare receipt by group and cohort, mean (std), 
outcomes in t+8. 
Group    81/83    87/89 
Difference 
(87/89–81/83) 
               
(Refugee) 
Immigrants  Log (earnings)  11.48  (1.09)    10.96  (1.51)  –0.52 
  Idleness (%)  12.72  (33.32)    29.24  (45.49)  16.52 
  Welfare receipt (%)  21.46  (41.06)    32.09  (46.68)  10.63 
               
Natives  Log (earnings)  11.94  (0.81)    11.85  (1.02)  –0.09 
  Idleness (%)  6.75  (25.09)    8.85  (28.40)  2.10 
  Welfare receipt (%)  3.69  (19.84)    4.10  (19.84)  0.41 
               
OECD  Log (earnings)  11.63  (1.08)    11.52  (1.28)  –0.11 
  Idleness (%)  15.44  (36.14)    23.06  (42.12)  7.62 
  Welfare receipt (%)  11.20  (31.55)    11.45  (31.84)  0.25 
               
Im 75/80  Log (earnings)  11.59  (1.02)    11.40  (1.31)  –0.19 
  Idleness (%)  11.97  (36.14)    23.36  (42.31)  12.39 
  Welfare receipt (%)  14.27  (34.98)    11.64  (32.07)  –2.63 
               
Young and 
less edu  Log (earnings)  11.67  (0.79)    11.36  (1.20)  –0.31 
natives  Idleness (%)  2.56  (15.78)    8.04  (27.18)  5.48 
  Welfare receipt (%)  9.34  (29.10)    13.59  (34.27)  4.25 
               
               
Notes: The comparison groups are weighted to conform to immigrants’ composition by year; i.e. the weights 
given to observations made in different years are the same in all comparison groups as in the immigrant 
sample. “Idleness” is defined as having zero earnings and study allowances. Outcomes measured in t+8, i.e. 
89/91 and 95/97 for all groups. Earnings deflated by the CPI. 
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Table A3: Difference-in-difference estimates with alternative comparison groups, 
outcomes in measured in t+8. 
  Program effect  Time effect  # individuals  R-squared 
         
Log earnings         
Natives  –.387  –.108  688,731  .12 
  (.029)  (.002)     
Young and less educated natives  –.081  –.414  117,714  .12 
  (.030)  (.007)     
Low-skilled natives  –.356  –.139  177,414  .04 
  (.030)  (.005)     
OECD  –.331  –.164  13,187  .11 
  (.047)  (.036)     
Immigrants 75/80  –.263  –.233  42,587  .08 
  (.032)  (.013)     
         
Idleness         
Natives  .123  .025  753,661  .10 
  (.008)  (.001)     
Young and less educated natives  .087  .061  128,872  .12 
  (.008)  (.001)     
Low-skilled natives  .105  .043  197,043  .07 
  (.008)  (.002)     
OECD  .066  .082  18,279  .15 
  (.013)  (.010)     
Immigrants 75/80  .056  .092  54,448  .12 
  (.009)  (.004)     
         
Welfare         
Natives  .077  .004  753,661  .06 
  (.009)  (.000)     
Young and less educated natives  .029  .051  128,872  .09 
  (.009)  (.002)     
Low-skilled natives  .073  .007  196,989  .05 
  (.009)  (.001)     
OECD  .085  –.005  18,279  .12 
  (.013)  (.009)     
Immigrants 75/80  .101  –.021  54,448  .10 
  (.010)  (.003)     
         
Notes: OLS parameter estimates, standard errors in parentheses. The regressions also include immigrant 
status, gender, age, age squared, level of education, region of origin, marital status (dummies for (a) being 
married, (b) having at least one child under 16, and interactions between gender and (a) and (b)), and 
interactions between immigrant status and remaining individual characteristics. For details on the 
different samples, see Tables A1a–c. The “Young and less educated natives” comparison group consists of 
natives aged 20–29 with no more than short high school education. “Low-skilled natives” consists of the 
quartile of the “Natives group” predicted to have the poorest outcomes by a regression of the outcome 
variable on individual characteristics. The native comparison groups have not been reweighted to conform 




Table A4: Estimates for individual variables in estimations for Table 7. 
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# individuals  6,418  9,883  9,883 
# municipalities  168  168  168 
Notes: Parameter estimates, standard errors in parentheses. See Table A1c for descriptive statistics.  
 